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Abstract
This paper discusses the outstanding process of political effervescence seen in Haiti during 
the nineteenth century, after the revolution of slaves in the French colony through a bloody 
fight for emancipation, delivering to its illiterate people written constitutions in the period 
between 1801 and 1816 and, supposedly, the freedom by the way of a Constituent assembly. 
Those documents astonishes, as they portray many fundamental (and even social) rights 
and guarantees, much more forcefully than later seen in the Americas or even in Europe. 
Important scholars gave fair attention for that on history and social studies, but the same does 
not occur in Law, and even less in constitutional law. The main argument of this article is 
that the suppression of the insurgency also perpetuates it with the subsequent constitutional 
silence about the episode and that this silence remains, unjustifiably, nowadays between the 
constitutional scholars studying popular constitutionalism.
Keywords: Constitutional History. Silence on history. Haiti Revolution and fundamental 
rights. Constituent Power.
Resumo
Este artigo discute o impressionante processo de efervescência política visto no Haiti durante 
o século XIX, após a revolução dos escravos da colônia francesa por meio de sangrenta luta 
pela emancipação, entregando aos seus analfabetos constituições escritas no período entre 
1801 e 1816 e, supostamente, a liberdade pelo caminho de uma Assembleia Constituinte. 
Esses documentos surpreendem, já que retratam diversos direitos e garantias fundamentais 
(e mesmo sociais), com muito mais intensidade do que visto mais tarde nas Américas ou até 
mesmo na Europa. Estudiosos importantes deram a devida atenção para que nas disciplinas 
de história e ciências sociais o tema fosse destacado, mas o mesmo não ocorre no Direito, e 
menos ainda no direito constitucional. O principal argumento deste artigo é que a supressão 
acadêmica da insurgência também se perpetua com o silêncio constitucional posterior sobre 
o episódio e que este silêncio permanece, injustificadamente, hoje em dia entre os estudiosos 
constitucionais ao tratar do tema do constitucionalismo popular.
Palavras-chave: História Constitucional. Silêncio na história. Revolução haitiana e direitos 
fundamentais. Poder Constituinte.
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1 Introducing the conflict: written constitutions are necessary
In an early period for what we call “constitutional” history in the western 
democracies, the former colony of São Domingos - how the province was called before 
it turns Haiti - built its republic of “Negros”. 
“Negros” or black people, because it created a revolutionary identity and erected 
constitutions founded in a racial element, in which the nationalizing aspect of the 
people was precisely “being black”, even if you were not black (as a racial element). 
Here, early is used as a comparison between the discourse of liberation in other 
countries of Latin America and Europe in this period. Haiti was the scene of the first 
and only slave uprising that actually succeeds with the revolutionary use of violence 
against the slave owners in the XIX century, which is due to essentially numerical 
and relatively strategic factors in organizing the riots. At the same time, was the only 
revolution that used the expression “Black Republic” as a way to call the pre-condition 
of rights of enjoyment, the structure of something very similar (and maybe unique) to 
an initial and unlimited Constituent power seeking citizenship as our idealized theory 
sees today: Constituent Power as the political tragedy in the heart of maquiavelianism 
since The Prince, NEGRI (1999, p. 05); LOUGHLIN (2004, p. 102).
Concomitant with this new Republic created, at least six written constitutions 
have been written: respectively in the years 1801, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807 and 18161. The 
constitutional norms not only brought individual freedoms or the “first generation” 
of rights as we learn in constitutional theory in that period. The Haitian constitutions 
exceeded in time and matter this classical category of “first generation rights” relegated 
by our contemporaries to the constitutional movement in that turn of the century: the 
achievement of freedom against the power of the state or the will of the Prince, the rise 
of a class as dominant or an individual bill of rights, that is called universal and now 
positivized (NEGRI, 1999, p. 06). Haitian constitutions were all this, but they were not 
just this.
In a central study on this subject, FISCHER (2003, p. 17) pointed out that some 
of the black republic texts spoke of ethnic identity, treated racism as an international 
problem, erected Haiti as the first nation to effectively abolish slavery in the 
international plan, and, among the internal policy of immigration, granted a kind of 
“political asylum” to black slaves from anywhere in the world, as long as they aimed 
to seek shelter in the state against slavery. The Republic in the XIX century paid them, 
for example, pension for this permanent stay in the country. As we will discuss below, 
those constitutions had a sophisticated constitutional stature in the black government.
Almost in a revanchist way, on the other side, the constitutional system restricted 
the participation of policy to whites, although white, as we shall see, it was not precisely 
1  Although seven new constitutions supervene until 1867, this work will summarize this research to 
those six constitutions, because of the expressiveness of their contents
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a skin pigment, but a feeling of belonging or not to what was being built for the first 
time as a nation under a popular constitution. The argument of this article is that the 
Haiti is a great example of development of rights in its robust constitutional texture. In 
an old slave colony (France’s largest productivity), and in the early nineteenth century, 
we can only see something similar in the next century, and, as history tells us in form 
of “constitution granted by populism or military movements”, not by revolutions, 
mainly in America. In other words, no country would contain an uprising so early to 
reach fundamental and social rights, and it was only effective because even its legal 
discourse was made promulgating constitutions.
It draws attention the fact that the constitutional researches does not speak 
openly about this episode in the constitutional history studies nowadays2, not only 
in the Americas, but in the European context as well. The constitutional history does 
not put in its script the Haitian revolution, but we can see some untold stories timidly 
appearing in other fields of human sciences. Because of all that, this work also aims at 
the present. Why aren’t we speaking about Haiti in constitutional law? Why, involving 
popular constitutionalism, we keep our eyes always on the United States or European 
history? Among the unstable period of attempts to turn the French colony in an 
economic system controlled by groups of masters, several armed conflicts have made 
impossible any attempt to unify this unfeasible power, especially because the intellectual 
organizations of this new regime was given by black leaders that conflicted with each 
other. They had to grant fundamental rights as a bargaining power, and that made Haiti 
a great laboratory of popular constitutionalism. However, these stories are untold.
It is important to say that we do not intend to treat the revolution in Haiti as a 
linear period of revolution that ended with the slave liberation, next to an idealized 
fashion of promulgation of written Constitutions to represent the popular will through 
an unconditioned constituent process. There is more than our modern imagination 
in this narrative mode of description. The interesting fact is that the armed conflict at 
that time culminated in constitutional texts that already anticipated the discourse of 
contemporary constitutionalism, but that this fact, paradoxically, seems to be off the 
constitutional history in the West, as if it was a fear of that, perhaps, is still present.
Our argument, similar to one already wrote in the history by Trouillot (1995), 
focuses on only one of the possible and inexplicable silences: the constitutional. 
Trouillot was concerned about the fact that the narratives of episodes in Haiti were, in 
2  The historical works and reviews about the events in Haiti was already well disseminated, and, in fact, 
propose a critical view of history seeking to strengthen attention to the events. The bibliography of 
this article is an example, although almost entirely published in the past 20 years. It happens that in 
constitutional law theory these texts and episodes do not appear with the minimum frequency that it 
should, even less in the books and manuals. There is a doctrinal and academic silence on the facts that 
already been denounced in other areas of knowledge, but that not includes the constitutional law, or at 
least the study of constitutional history in the western democracies.
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its entirety, Eurocentric, accompanied by all this liberal imagination, and those silences 
were given in various fields. More precisely, Trouillot speaks about four silencers 
movements: the silence on historical sources, on the files, on the choices of events as 
more or less important to narrate the episodes and on the omission of the narrators 
dealing with the debate.
As it will be seen later, our linear imagination in history of fundamental rights 
suffers from similar pathology, which tells that since French Revolution it was possible 
the realization of rights until we reach the complex role that we have today in modern 
and normative constitutions, but emphasizes the events that the teller prefers, and 
Haiti is never present. Why the Haitian revolution is not a big part of the history of 
our constitutional maturity? Do their normative and institutional State brought by 
constitutions have any influence in the next centuries of abolition of slavery? In the 
next chapter, we want to discuss the episodes that help to understand the idiosyncratic 
process of revolution in Haiti, being aware that describe the history of Haiti, here, is 
only to hear reports of other researchers. Then, we will point out the main elements 
of the constitutions as pioneer documents during impressive events, highlighting 
the success in emancipation. Finally, this work points out the problem of this cyclic 
forced historical silence on the Haitian episode, something that can bring weakness to 
constitutionalism studies. It would be unfair with its history.
2 At the eve of the uprising
The former colony of São Domingos represented the largest colonial productivity 
of Europe: between 1783 and the outbreak of the French Revolution, São Domingos 
exported an estimated of 70 tons of white sugar and 50,000 tonnes of raw sugar 
(DAVIS, 1928, p. 25). For that, more than one and a half million slaves were employed 
in various types of enterprises, including cocoa, sugar, tobacco, coffee and cotton, 
making the colony of “São Domingos” more than a third of the entire French 
commercial production, one of the greatest economies in the world3.
At that time, the colony was administered by a governor-general and a 
superintendent, both appointed by the Minister of the French Navy, responsible for 
the administration of the colonies. The quasi-military management still occurred, 
interestingly, during the French outbreak in 1789, which allowed some discussion in 
the city’s environment about the granting of equal rights between whites and blacks.
In order to protect the regime, the colony had many “colored men”, as they were 
called: mulattos, but also landowners, slave masters and freemen. Churches and public 
spaces granted them special seats, and the numerical growth of mulattos in these 
3  “The value of these products at the present market values would exceed $ 5,000,000. The full value of 
the establishments, lands, slaves, and livestock was estimated at $ 193,500,000.” (DAVIS, 1923, p. 25).
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conditions would relate the profitability of São Domingos with a specific method of 
segregation4. In other words, mulattoes were slaveholders; mulattos exercised civil 
rights restricted to those who held freedom. This fact expands the possibility of racist 
conflict by allowing new discrimination within already segregationist institutions.
With the National Constituent Assembly and the Estates-General in French, 
1789 seemed to be the perfect time for the realization of the abolitionist project in 
Haiti. That is the reason why the white masters of the colony of São Domingos sent 
representative committees to the Metropolis, given the urgency of this agenda. The 
hostility to the regime and the popular dissatisfaction had crossed the Atlantic as we 
see in the narrative of the Minister of Marine to the French National Assembly in 1790:
[...] The colony is at this moment in the greatest agitation. Two 
parties divided it. The first, entirely devoted to the General 
Assembly, demands its continuation; The other seeks its dissolution. 
This Latter party is the more Numerous, and contains the 
intelligent and responsible most citizens. Nevertheless I very much 
doubt Whether it will be successful For the other party is made up 
of the discontented, the Declaimers against pretended despotism, 
and the mass of working men and artisans, who are persuaded que 
Their opponents are composed. (DAVIS, 1928, p. 33).
On May 15, 1791, the French National Assembly has determined that mulatto 
children of freedmen could participate in general meetings in São Domingos and 
discuss political affairs. In response, the governor of the colony curiously defined the 
urgent and necessary “suspension of this right”. Miscegenation was admitted at an 
initiative of the metropolis (it was the “great right” that the revolutionary bourgeoisie 
granted, keeping, however, the slavery), but was immediately suppressed by authorities 
in the colony. Obviously, the rise of hate speech occurred since then in the country 
(DAVIS, 1928, p. 34).
The speeches of liberation, therefore, were easily dodged by France. It is 
documented that the revolutionary men of French revealed cynical discourses, and 
some important revolutionaries as Robespierre arrived at the assemblies just proposing 
the change of a nomenclature in São Domingos: slave to non-free. The Estates-
General created by French revolutionaries then summed up the freedom of the French 
Revolution to France, to the metropolis, not to the colonies.
At the same time, isolated uprisings contributed to a necessary popular 
disorganization before the revolutionary movement outbreaks. Chavanes, one of the 
4  “In 1789 it was estimated que the mulattoes possessed at least ten per cent of the productive land 
and owned over 50,000 slaves. Many of them had been educated in France, where They Were not 
discriminated” (DAVIS, 1928, p. 29).
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leaders of the liberating project, was also easily defeated and executed with cruelty 
along with some leaders in March 1791, increasing the discontent of mulattos.
Jean-Franqois, who had acknowledged that he was the leader of the blacks 
with some delay, assumed the title of “Grand Admiral of France” and, with men like 
Biassou, Boukmann, and Jean Jannot, completely controlled the insurgent Negroes of 
the North. The country was in a state of unutterable confusion, the people was divided 
not only by color and race, but also by conflicting political ideas. The Negroes, who 
outnumbered the combined whites and mulattoes by not less than eight to one, had to 
some extent begun to perform their strength, but they were yet unorganized and had 
not yet well-defined plans for the abolition of slavery (DAVIS, 1928, p. 37).
When the city announces the impossibility of liberating project, it seemed 
impossible to resist. Why the French revolutionaries recognized the freedom only 
far away from the colony? The colonial north was prepared to initiate the revolution, 
since Jean-Franqois was declared a black leader. More than 500,000 blacks joined the 
fight for independence and freedom by violence and not by petition, mainly led by 
Boukman, a voodoo leader who found a certain syncretism with western elements. 
The confusion was evident: there was a clear plan for how the abolition of slavery plans 
would be defined, but soon a political document would need to establish that power 
almost created.
In June 1793, the main town of the colony, Cap Français, was set on fire by slaves. 
The lords, if not decimated violently, left the colony desperately. Some authors narrates 
the event as the biggest massacre of Latin America, “Estimating the death toll between 
3,000 and 10,000, and Popkin calls the city’s destruction the most murderous instance 
of urban conflict in the history of the Americas (presumably overlooking the sack of 
Tenochtitlan in 1521)” (GEGGUS, 2013, p. 201).
In 1794, an armed black group of São Domingos finally forced the French 
Republic to recognize the slave abolition on that island, although persistent armed 
uprisings occurred even before, specifically in 1679, 1713, 1720, 1730.1758, 1777, 1782 
and 1787 (BUCK-MORSS, 2000, p. 833). There was resistance, and several attempts to 
restore the slave regime made the movement even more conflicting.
Toussaint-Loverture sign then the first constitutional “unifier” text of 1801, and its 
terms know how to complete bravely: “one French Republic and indivisible.” However, 
that was not a challenge against Napoleon Bonaparte, who was concerned to accelerate 
the mission of colonial reconquer, and his prime minister denounced this problem. 
In response, Toussaint declared that the people were a friend of Bonaparte, fearing 
obviously retaliation (JANVIER, 1806, p. 24).
Haiti’s image closes in a bloody episode in this dialectic (Metropolis/Colony) to the 
intermediation of an irrepressible conflict. The last step of this turning is the crowd of 
white public being systematically assassinated. However, this movement of disorder did 
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not made the revolution a movement without any order. It is here that the constitutional 
texts contribute to put this desire for power in an institutional organization, and this 
movement is impressive when we look to the constitutions wrote.
We intend to give some examples of this impressiveness in the next chapter, 
outlining the precocity of the freedom and social rights granted in the process of 
emancipation.
3 A Pointless silence
As we tried to sum above, the Haitian episode is a great study case to the 
history of constitutionalism. More specifically, what might be called real popular 
constitutionalism. The revolution not only culminated in constitutional texts 
filled with normative rights similar to what we tried to call today in contemporary 
constitutionalism as “systems of human rights” or “constitutional blocks”. Above all, it 
represented a very concrete way that our presentism idealizes as unlimited constituent 
power, original and absolutely able to establish the list of fundamental guarantees and 
liberal protection against the State, even if it does so using racial violence.
We do not mean that the precocity of the Constitutions is the result of a 
revolution, occurred as an isolated fact in the world. After all, slave uprisings had 
occurred and destabilized political and legal systems established in Americas. The 
colonial Brazil saw in their Bahian territory, movements like the Balaiada in Maranhão 
(with the support of Quilombos) and the “Inconfidência mineira” as nineteenth-
century movements that had similar ideals, where the anti-slavery black audience was, 
if not forced to drive the uprising, one of its good arguments. However, nowhere we 
saw something like the big uprising occurred in Haiti. No colony, empire, kingdom or 
city witnessed the bloody execution of this abolitionist effort with the subsequent and 
immediate positivation of constitutions with expansive catalog of fundamental rights 
in constitutional texts.
For instance: the first constitution, led by Toussaint Louverture in 1801, states 
that São Domingo is “part of the French Empire” (although France was, until 1804, 
a Consulate since the coup of 18 Brumaire where Napoleon was crowned Emperor 
only in 1805), giving a reflection of the Bonapartist fear mentioned above. Making the 
constitution demands a symbolic statement that showed international respect. However, 
the internal political sovereignty was secured, and never was submissive: according to 
the political system erected, no law would be valid on its territory if was not approved 
by the São Domingos Assembly (FISCHER, 2003, p. 18). Slavery was finally abolished 
in a very significant text: “Article 3. There can be no slaves in the territory. Slavery is 
abolished forever here, and all men are born, live and die free and French...”.
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Free and French. Note that the Constitution lists that the people finally “are 
born and shall live as free men”. A necessary script, after all the abolitionist discourse 
of that time was perverse, acted as an excuse for the next generations of slaves been 
kept and isolated at a lower social caste. The people of São Domingos understood that 
freedom is a condition with which it is born, lives and dies (FISCHER, 2003, p. 18). Not 
coincidentally, the constitution gave the state protection for all men in the plantation 
system, suggesting agrarian reform, and created bases for judicial and administrative 
organization under the principles of full equality, away from racial discrimination5.
In 1804, Dessalines declared independence, although its constitution comes with 
one-year delay, in 1805, suggesting some institutional discussion on its writing: now 
the Executive and Legislative powers are absolute, cutting the French empowerment. 
Dessalines also took advantage of this strategic populism: the text is referred to as 
the “protector of freedom,” and his generals promises him “blind obedience” on 
this project FISCHER (2003, p. 18). Dessalines celebrated on October 6, 1804 his 
consecration as Emperor, and “[…] without knowing how to write his name, entrusts 
his secretaries to draft a constitution” (FISCHER, 2003, p. 20), scheduled for May 20, 
1805. Its preamble provides that “all mortals are alike, and it’s widespread in world 
so many different classes of beings for the sole purpose of manifesting his glory and 
power through the diversity of their works”. But in the constitutional text appears the 
first political segregation: “Art. 12. No white person, whatever their nationality, may 
enter this territory as Lord or owner, or may in the future acquire ownership at all.” 
This principle will remain until the constitutional reforms of 1918 (FISCHER, 2003, 
p. 21). Article 14, finally, lists the most peculiar national element in the history of 
constitutionalism: “Having to disappear all color distinction between children of the 
same family, from whom is a father of the head of state, Haitians will be known from 
now on the generic name of black”.
This leads FISCHER (2003, p. 20) to recognize an impressive “radical 
constitutional reinterpretation” in the text of 1805, the “most disturbing paradox of 
modern universalist politics” while calling on all Haitians, no matter what the color 
of their skin, black. “We, the people” as “We, the blacks”, even though not being black, 
maybe is one of the biggest phenomena in popular constitutionalism all over the world. 
They are no longer linked to the territory element: Haitian, German, French, American, 
Brazilians. They are black. Claude Moise (1988), cited by Fischer (2003, p. 21) mentions 
the case as a legal fiction that highlights the problem of race in Haiti, although this 
legal category is not, in fact, repeated or used to distinguish other rights and duties, 
but only the enjoyment of property FISCHER (2003, p. 21). Calling “all blacks” as 
5  “Art. 4. All men, no matter the color of your skin, can be admitted here for any office. Art. 5. There 
is no other distinction than that of virtues and talents, and there is no other superiority than that 
which gives the law in the exercise of a public function. The law is the same for all, so that punishes as 
protecting”.
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citizens is a radical political act that brings a redefinition of legal categories: “Es, por 
cierto, un signo de cuán diferentemente pudo haberse desarrollado la teoría politica si 
el pensamiento sobre la libertad, la igualdad y la fraternidad se hubiese concentrado en 
aspectos de raza y color antes que, digamos, de nación o clase” (FISCHER, 2003, p. 22).
Befallen the Republic in 1806, the concern with the racial element returns now 
to define the exceptions strictly where white can be landowners, “those who perform 
civilian jobs or are part of the army” (FISCHER, 2003, p. 24). The first constitution 
of Cristophe, finally, establishes the category of citizens (Art. 1) “any person who 
resides in Haitian territory, is free by law.” The constitutions of 1816, on the other side, 
suggest aspects that are more interesting: the idea of a welfare Haitian state taking into 
account the elements of color and black slavery. Here there is not only transnational 
concern for the slavery phenomenon, an early international condemnation because “el 
antiesclavismo radical de Haiti no podía circumscribirse sin dificultad a las fronteras 
del Estado” (FISCHER, 2003, p. 26), but still a very positive benefit, protectionist, to all 
those who seek refuge from slave regimes for Haiti. Article 6 of the Constitution of 1816 
provided at the end of its text that “all those born abroad of a Haitian, man or woman, 
are Haitians, as well as those who already currently hold recognition as Haitians.” Art. 
7 concluded: “All Africans or Indians and their descendants could become Haitians. 
The law shall regulate procedures for naturalization.”
FISCHER then cites the Decree of 1818 where, following the norms leaders above, 
Dessalines is committed to a social and humanity fight against slavery according to 
this constitutional novelty: “Considering that a large number of native blacks and 
colored people are suffering in the United States lack of dignity and intends to return, 
DECLARES that will be sent to American craft the sum of $ 40 for each individual 
if they return to their country [...]. that one copy to be shipped to the US Congress 
immediately “(FISCHER, 2003, p. 26). Let us recall that the Constitution of 1801 calls 
itself as a “asylum “, a “safe haven” for all oppressed blacks in the international plan 
(FISCHER, 2003, p. 31), a public international law discourse that will only be known 
later, at least in the transition to the twenty century, and after the segregationist policy 
in Unites States. 
In Brazil, for example, positive benefits and effective social assistance as a 
function of the state or anything similar will only be seen with the Eloy Chaves law and 
the wave of totalitarianism on the twentieth century, accompanied by the New State 
in the opening of 1920. This function was until then restricted to religious institutions 
in the imperial stage, and charities institutions as “Santa Casa” is an example, always 
parallel to the state institution in the nineteenth century. While United States and 
Brazilian constitutions were absent from any positive social right involving slavery 
issues and social inclusion of blacks in 1800, what can be said about the constitution of 
1801 of Haiti to ensure, as seen, asylum to foreign slaves?
36
Revista Brasileira de Direito, Passo Fundo, vol. 13, n. 2, p. 26-40, Mai.-Ago. 2017 - ISSN 2238-0604
One last interesting point is how to interpret these Constitutions and the 
upcoming conflicts on this process. FISCHER (2003, p. 33) asks how popular 
sovereignty would be held, the authority of the people, when the Head of State 
(Cristophe) and the vast majority of the population are unlettered? The less accessible to 
the people the constitutional text was, the more difficult can be their normative force. 
For FISCHER (2003, p. 34), this is an indication of the constitution as a “tautological” 
element in which a literate minority exercise the power, a very present problem of 
legitimacy in the field of Popular Constitutionalism since the well-known “declarations 
of independence”.
Haiti reached the actual release through a violent process, killing lords and 
opponents, discriminating public management against whites. First abolished slavery, 
slavery became then an international issue in a constitutional text after a violent seizure 
of power. We can call this, with Antonio Negri, a real constituent power even if their 
people could not read. This movement was not seen in any other colony in the colonial 
period. Interestingly, the written constitution was necessary for this partial success 
possible. The legal textuality was a crucial necessity made by leaders.
There are many hypotheses that might explain this textuality working for 
the people, and not against them. The exegetical positivism, positivism in its most 
rudimentary form, was the asset that French lawyers alleged to have: the greatness 
of text that “not needs to be interpreted”. Duguit and the Napoleonic Code are clear 
demonstrations of that rudimentary positivism in legal theory. There are evidences of a 
constant dialogue between Napoleon and the former colony, as seen above, sometimes 
resuming his control, sometimes allowing its opening, indicating evident emperor 
political manipulations that weakened the young Republic and later surrendered the 
state again to France. However, it indicates a possible explication to the question of why 
constitutions were written.
The fact is that a written constitution (and perhaps the French influence of the 
written text, grueling, authoritative) was a set of ideas that came out of France to 
its colony São Domingo in a subtle transportation, evidently an invisible process of 
colonization. Something essential and spiritual that, somehow, allowed all that will 
of power to the Haitian illiterate that were not dispersed, were not dissipated between 
“violent crowd.” The fact is that slavery never returned in the country. They were free 
and French.
We need to emphasize that this moment is crucial to the history of 
constitutionalism, and should be studied as a relevant “constitutional moment” for 
fundamental rights. It seems an unpardonable mistake to omit it. The passage of such 
events may have, if not more, at least the same relevance as judgements like Marbury 
vs. Madison or Brown vs. Board of education for understanding the constitutionalism 
as phenomenon or the fundamental rights as something important to protect, as well 
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as the movement of American constitutionalism. The revolution in Haiti have the 
same important of works about constitutionalism away from courts, and the endless 
bibliography on those missions. Studying the American apartheid of the twentieth 
century in place of the Haitian revolutions in the nineteenth century is not a fair 
process with history, is more like an option. There is no point on giving less historical 
significance to the Haitian constitutional process and its implications, as there is 
no sense in miss the opportunity to study it as a constituent process, as popular 
constitutionalism, as history of constitutionalism that could have made great influence 
on another abolitionist movements.
Outside the law, perhaps the greatest work to problematize the Haitian 
episode is the article of Susan-buck Morss (2003, p. 825), a great reading about the 
revolutionary events and the philosophical reading of Hegel in his dialectic known 
about master and slave. Her concern is similar, with the difference that the analysis 
lies in a provocative question about the possibility of the European philosopher had 
accessed this information, and then highlighted or omitted those insights it in his 
work. Montesquieu entered at the same time in this context in France, but did not say 
a word about Haiti revolutions. The dialectic of master and slave, essential figure for 
understanding the Spirit phenomenology in Hegel, arises when Hegel read Minerva 
newspaper in Jena. The attention of the author is the ability of the young Hegel grasps 
that movement, or hides it in his essays on the dialectic of the master and slave. Morss 
questioned, somehow, the problem of the “omission” of the philosophers around this 
new world that surrounded them.
As stated above, the silence it is highlighted by other authors who care about 
this hiding process in the Haitian history, when we speak about the formation of a 
“rational” modern state, especially the constitutional:
There are four silences that we must be aware of in regard to Haiti. 
One is the silence in the making of the sources, that is, which events 
get remembered, described, or Reported in the way que allows this 
to transcend the present. Two, the silence in the creation of archives 
and repositories of historical records is a basic consideration. What 
records are preserved and used? What archives are accessible 
and present to the historian? Three, choices in terms of what is 
broadcast and what is not is a profound arena for silencing. Four, 
the silence que comes from people, historians, and interpreters of 
narrations Ultimately produces history. This means not everything 
that is narrated will be accepted the history. It might not become a 
part of the corpus unless it is received and accepted by those who 
would ensure its success to the narration (ASSANTE, 2011, p. 285).
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The most serious omission, finally, refers to the class struggle, the political 
process, silencing the constitutional synthesis of a fight between black and white 
people, slaves and masters in a clash that ended with fundamental rights erected 
in constitutions even at the early turn of the eighteenth century, and within a nice 
institutional design. Throughout the revolutionary phase, the driving motor of the 
revolution is the constant weakness of that “black” power: the concern about restoring 
the slave regime.
The revolution, says Karl Marx, is the locomotive of history. Here is 
a locomotive that had worked in an amazing speed, because in April 
1972, or after three years of the fall of the Bastille, the White Patriots 
at Port au Prince were being besieged by a combined army of realistic 
commanders, white farmers, skin mulattos brown, black slaves; all 
volunteers, and for now, free and equal partners. No doubt most of 
the rich was just waiting for the restoration of order to put the slaves 
back in their places, but the simple fact of having a revolutionary 
association and a temporary equality meant that the old spell was 
broken and things would never be the same (JAMES, 1989, p. 112).
Why important narratives as those are unnoticed in the history of 
constitutionalism? What is irrelevant here? The news that the revolution had arrived in 
France, published in German and French newspapers, frightened slaveholders. Since at 
that time, it is noticed that “The Moniteur, day after day, was wondering why no news 
from Blanchelande? On November, the Moniteur printed a copy of the letter that the 
colonists had written to the Jamaican Governor” (JAMES, 1989, p. 114). Two centuries 
later, relevant stories are untold. The revolutionary upsurge does not seem to be part of 
any history, at least as it is treated. Meanwhile, the popular constitutionalism doctrine 
selects another repetitive targets: the courts in judicial review, the courts against de 
Legislative Power, or the “innovation” of the example of the Court Warren to diagnose 
the problem of lack of popular legitimacy. This lack of memory on constitutional 
history must be outlined as something wrong or even harmful.
4 Conclusion
The political process of slave emancipation in Haiti by popular violence is a rich 
environment for constitutional research. This place, however, is empty, not explored in 
the history of constitutionalism, much less by Popular Constitutionalism, although it 
would be a living example of the most central object of the Constitution in the hands 
of a people oppressed, giving them fundamental rights even more deeper than the 
commonly studied revolutions in another scenarios.
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It would be a good reflection of what can be achieved if we give full historical 
accessibility of these events to the society, in times when we still have difficulties to 
discuss or implement, for example, policies of racial inclusion, refuted by parties in 
Brazil (ALENCASTRO, 2010), or, worse than that, while we still see racial violence 
episodes mainly in the United States.
At least on Brazil, the history of Haiti is not present in the primary, secondary 
or higher Brazilian studies degrees, much less the strength of its constitutionalism. 
This story seems to be much closer to us, and not only geographically, than the United 
States or Europe. The constant challenge with the French metropolis goes unnoticed, 
contradictorily also a revolutionary movement. This disturbing political process is not 
even discussed in most of the contemporary legal schools. At least in our context, racial 
revolutions studied are the Brazilians, which, interestingly, we know well the outcome.
This historical silence of constitutionalists toward the Haitian revolution is 
something inexcusable. This omission is irresponsible, as long as Haiti’s constitution 
is an object of study for important subjects such as constituent power, fundamental 
rights and constitutional history. Perhaps the great fear on the disclosure of these 
events has not yet been gone, may still be present. If the data tell us something, we 
know that the black population is more than half of the Brazilian population and 
that, at least in 2010, in the age groups of 18, only 7.7% blacks were college students 
(ALENCASTRO, 2010, p. 08). We also know that, numerically, the Brazilian slavery 
was practiced on a scale never seen before6, but we do not want to use these numbers 
as conclusive impressionism argument. A first step to continue this discussion would 
be another census that simply questioned in a University sample space, especially 
postgraduate programs in Public Law with emphasis on constitutional history, the 
following question: “Do you know what the revolution in Haiti was or remember to 
have studied it at some point in your basic or higher education? Can you tell what 
the content of their constitutions at that time? Was more or less developed than the 
European and American constitutionalism that after became?” The number of scholars 
studying in depth the American constitutionalism would only be justified because of 
the vast literature and structure that the United States universities environment itself 
offers, but not the significance of the facts themselves. At least when we look at Haiti as 
a comparison.
6  “In fact, no American country practiced slavery on such a large scale as Brazil. Of the total of about 
11 million Africans deported and living arrivals in the Americas, 44% (nearly 5 million) came to 
Brazil for a period of three centuries (1550-1856) the other major slave country on the continent, the 
United States, the slave trade practiced for just over a century (between 1675 and 1808) and received a 
much smaller proportion - close to 560,000 Africans – which means 5.5% of total transatlantic trade” 
(ALENCASTRO, 2010, p. 02).
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